A twitter user by the name of Fidato in a series of tweets analyzed the factors behind Kargil war and how Pakistan capitalized on the war to achieve strategic objectives.
To see the Kargil conflict in isolation would be a mistake
23 years ago on this day, Kargil war came to an end after a series of deadly skirmished between the forces of both countries. Kargil war is usually termed as a policy blunder of Pakistan. Fidato analyses the strategic significance of the war for Pakistan in a series of Pakistan and proves the war in fact paved way for the country to achieve some long standing strategic milestones.
“The Battle in Kargil was one of the most pivotal moments in the history of the region. If it had not been undertaken by Pakistan, it could have lost its strategic significance and slipped into an economic mayhem from which it may not have recovered.” In the 1990s, American and Pakistani policies were on a ‘collision course’.
“The Battle in Kargil was one of the most pivotal moments in the history of the region. If it had not been undertaken by Pakistan, it could have lost it’s strategic significance and slipped into an economic mayhem from which it may not have recovered” #KargilVijayDiwas
THREAD
— Fidato (@tequieremos) July 26, 2021
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 reduced Pakistan’s importance for the US. Between 1991-2000, Pakistan received just $429 million in aid, as opposed to $5 billion in the previous decade. Moreover the Pressler Amendment, passed in 1985 to put restrictions on Pakistan’s nuclear program had almost lead to the collapse of her economy.
Afghanistan: gateway of conflict
As a result, cooperation with Afghanistan was vital for any aspiring regional power to gain access from energy rich Central Asia. For this, Pakistan was the front runner. India’s ‘Rao doctrine’ forced her to capitulate in Afghanistan; assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, insurgencies in Punjab, Kashmir and Assam, failed Operation Pawan and dried up foreign exchange reserves were reasons for the policy shift.
While Afghan Taliban had defeated the Northern Alliance which was supported by India and Russia, over 90% of Afghanistan was in their control in 1998. Indian presence in Afghanistan, what little that existed, was completely gone. India would now strive to cooperate with any power that was willing to cut Pakistan down to size.
Read more: Kargil War anniversary: India-Pakistan fail to build relations
For the US and India there were two options to isolate Pakistan. One was the economic sanction route and the other was for India to sever Sino-Pak land link from its position in the Siachin Glacier and threaten Gilgit area. Coming to the first option.
Economic meltdown of economy in 90s
When India conducted a series of underground nuclear tests on 11 May 1998, Pakistan was nearly bankrupt but had to make a choice. Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves were less than $1 billion.
Coming to the first option, when India conducted a series of underground nuclear tests on 11 May 1998, Pakistan was nearly bankrupt but had to make a choice. Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves were less than $1 billion.
If Pakistan opted for the nuclear tests, severe US economic sanctions were on the cards. Pakistan spend seventeen days deliberating and finally decided to conduct the tests. As expected, the US enforced the 1994 non proliferation act.
The four consecutive governments since 1988 drew huge un audited loans from the IMF and World Bank. That had put Pakistan in deep financial deficit. The US voted against further loans from the IMF and World Bank after the nuclear tests in 1998.
Read more: Beg, Borrow and Repeat: A Tale of Pakistan’s Obsession with the IMF
At that point, Pakistan was down to only $600 million in foreign exchange reserves against an outstanding foreign debt of $38 billion. The nuclear tests by Pakistan had given the US the much needed advantage over Pakistan through which it hoped to reign in Pakistan.
To ease the economic pressure, Saudi Arabia agreed to a three year plan to accept deferred oil payments from Pakistan in 1998. According to one Western diplomat, the Saudis after three years of deferred payments practically wrote off the payments. In 1998, according to Guardian when the Saudis bailed out Pakistan, oil prices had fallen to $10 a barrel and “the Saudis had an unprecedented budget deficit and even had to borrow money.”
Now the second option was for India to cut Pakistan’s land link to China and threaten he Skardu and Gilgit area thus carving out a land route into Central Asia.
Indian and Russian Alliance
Before the conflict in Kargil had erupted, heavy mobilization of Indian forces was reported in the Kargil area. It was assisted by Russian technical experts. The co-operation between India and Russia is understandable keeping in view the conversations between Strobe Talbott (former US Deputy Secretary of State, Jaswant Singh (former Indian foreign minister) and Yevgeny Primakov (former Soviet Premier).
After the US launched 60 Tomahawk cruise missiles into Afghanistan on 20 Aug 1998, Jaswant Singh arrived in Washington and pointed out to Talbott:
“A nuclear armed India was a natural ally of the United States in the struggle against Islamic fundamentalism, while a nuclear armed Pakistan was a threat to both the countries”. Talbott was given similar warnings from Soviet Premier Yevgeny Primakov who had told him that “the globe cannot live with a Talibanized Pakistan that has the bomb”.
Read more: Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: Guarantor of deterrence and survival
Meanwhile fighting erupted in the mountains of Kargil which lasted for just over two months. Despite losing a number of its soldiers, India failed to dislodge the occupiers. With 20,000 Indian troops desperate for food and military supplies in Siachin Glacier because of Pakistan’s control of Dras-Kargil road, President Clinton convinced PM Nawaz Sharif for withdrawal.
Debt rescheduling
But importantly, Pakistan got the much needed economic relief. The London Club agreed to schedule their $860 million loan to Pakistan. This was in addition to the already rescheduled loan of $3.2 billion from the Paris Club Creditors. On 6th July 1999, a number of foreign banks had agreed to a 3 year restructuring of $510 million worth of commercial debt to Pakistan.
Additionally by 28 July 1999, IMF gave indications that they were willing to release an installment worth $280 million.
Indian intimidation before the conflict
The military conflict in Kargil had alot to do with Indian army’s movement along the LoC. Pakistan had observed that India was using helicopters to move guns, armed personnel, armoured, air defense regiments and other logistical units in September 1998.
Infact the Indian military had begun a regular campaign of interdiction of supplies along the Neelum Valley on the Muzzafarabad-Kel road since 1992 which forced Pakistan to build the alternative Laswa and Kiran by passes. In 1994, the interdiction by Indian forces was on such a scale that the Neelum Valley road had to be closed.
Read more: Book review: From Kargil to the Coup
The extent of civilian suffering was so extensive that UNMOGIP took up the matter with UN in 1997/98 seeking the running of humanitarian convoys to provide relief. India had unilaterally banned the supervision by UN observers along the LoC.
The reason behind the buildup of Indian forces in ’90s along the LoC was explained by Lt Gen P.N.Hoon during an interview with Rediff on 5 Aug 1999 in which he disclosed the real intentions of Siachin offensive.
Hoon called himself the brain behind Operation Meghdoot 1984.“Siachin has to be held for some time. Till we consolidate. We concentrate our force and keep it ready for a riposte through an area at a time of our convenience. When I will hit Pakistan with this force even in winter, I will just go and take Gilgit, Skardu and hit the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan”.
Pakistan strategic vigilance
To prevent India’s plans for further adventurism in Siachin, Pakistan established strategic military posts to target the Dras-Kargil road that was used by India to provide food and military supplies to it’s 20,000 soldiers in Siachin.
Praveen Swami later on disclosed that the key objective of India’s Operation Vijay in the Kargil war was to secure the peak 5353 which has a domineering view of the national highway between Srinagar and Leh. But Indian forces failed. Pakistan continues to occupy the peak 5353 on the strategic Marpo La Ridge well inside the Indian LoC.
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It means Artillery observers on peak 5353 can direct accurate artillery fire to up to 20 km of the National Highway 1A. As we can see that there were multiple dynamics at play by the time the Kargil conflict came on the scene. To see the Kargil conflict in isolation would be a mistake.