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Tuesday, November 12, 2024

Lawfare against Pakistan: coercion or self-inflicted wounds?

Head of international practice of a leading law firm in Oman explains the campaign of weaponizing the global legal system against Pakistan and the lawfare that it faces. He encourages the country to sharpen its tools for it. Otherwise, he warns, it will continue being in the eye of the storm again and again.

By Hassan Aslam Shad
Pakistan

Hassan Aslam Shad |

Law school teaches that coercion negates free will. It is grounds for exclusion of liability and culpability. We all know what is written in law but implemented in practice are two different things. Theoretically, coercion shouldn’t have a place in international relations either. If this were the case, the entire edifice of international treaties and agreements wouldn’t be worth the paper they are written on.

Yet, coercion, in varying form and degree, exists in both international law and relations. Countries continue to be forced, coerced, cornered, manipulated (you name it) to do or abstain from doing something particular. Legally speaking, this is in violation of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter which proclaims that all sovereigns (countries) are equal.

In other words, equals cannot be treated unequally. Could this possibly imply that some countries (with a greater political and economic clout) are perhaps more equal than others? Indeed. Policymakers and strategic thinkers who are unaware of this are living in fool’s paradise.

Coercion through Lawfare?

And countries are no longer coercing other countries through traditional methods. The rules of the game are changing fast. Battlelines are increasingly being drawn on the financial, economic and legal fronts. Pakistan is no exception.  It faces its own lawfare that is emanating from different verticals. Echoes of this lawfare can be heard everywhere: calls for compliance with international law, reminders to change behaviour, end support of terrorism etc. are but some examples. And the list goes on and on.

Pakistan was placed on the FATF greylist in June 2018. Not a respectable list to land in for a country in the 21st Century. This is the second time Pakistan was moved to the greylist

This narrative is now new. It gained traction since 911. But in the last one and a half year or so, the edges of this lawfare have been further sharpened. In simple words, it is a campaign of weaponizing the international legal system against Pakistan. The campaign originates from the global corridors of power. The idea being to force, rather corner, country to follow a specific trajectory. What is important to know, for now, is that our country is in the eye of the storm.

Dimensions of the Lawfare Storm

This lawfare against Pakistan has a legal and economic dimension. It is partly the result of the rapidly changing security and geo-strategic equation – something inevitable due to Pakistan’s strategic posturing. Part of it is unfortunately due to Pakistan’s failure to come to grips with a rapidly evolving global order. And this is where the rubber hits the road.

Pakistan ought to know that its adversaries are engaged in what can be termed as “war by other means”. The weapon in this warfare is law, the soldier in this war is the lawyer and policymaker, and it is being waged in international organizations and forums. The country can counter this only through its own well calibrated counter weapon.

Unlike kinetic weaponry, however, this weapon is not available in the international market. Its manufacturing will require understanding the nuances of the international legal framework, investing in brains and strategic thinking, and eventually taking steps towards institutionalizing that thinking. Pakistan’s policymakers must understand the seriousness of marshalling law as a resource and the fact that the duel in the present day is as much through legal rules as it is with tanks and fighter jets. Pakistan needs its own lawfare more than ever before.

Pakistan is one of those countries that face multiple threats at the domestic and international fronts. At the international front, Pakistan’s challenges are increasing in intensity with every passing day and are showing no signs of relenting. One of the biggest challenges that country faces today is from FATF.

The FATF

FATF, short for Financial Action Task Force, is an intergovernmental institution that deals with Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combatting Financing of Terrorism (CFT). Its powers over the years have exponentially increased in view of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions that have designated certain individuals and groups as terrorists and which collectively require all countries of the world to take action. In other words, the overarching nature of legal rules and the politicization of the global order has transformed FATF into a potent international body with unprecedented powers.

FATF currently comprises of 36 member countries and 2 regional organizations (GCC and EC). Some prominent members of FATF are US, Canada, China, Germany, France, Russia, Turkey, UK, India, Malaysia and Israel. Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have an observer status with the FATF. Besides these member countries, nine regional organizations with an AML/CFT mandate are its associate members.

This includes the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). Additionally, some prominent international organizations with AML/CFT mandate also have observer status with the FATF. These include the World Bank and the IMF.

The Double Whammy

Pakistan was placed on the FATF greylist in June 2018. Not a respectable list to land in for a country in the 21st Century. This is the second time Pakistan was moved to the greylist. Earlier, Pakistan was placed on this list in 2012 which it exited in 2015.

Since being placed on the greylist again in June 2018, Pakistan has been asked to meet a huge list of AML/CFT requirements. Not only is Pakistan trying to exit the greylist, it faces a double whammy: it can be moved to the blacklist if FATF determines it has fallen short.

Whether or not Pakistan will be moved to the blacklist will be decided at the FATF plenary scheduled to be held in Paris between 13-18 October 2019. It is reported that since landing on the greylist, Pakistan’s economy has suffered an annual loss of around USD 10 billion.

Let’s look at what has most recently happened at FATF.

FATF’s 21 June 2019 Public Statement

FATF held a plenary between 17-21 June 2019. On 21 June, FATF made the following official statement about Pakistan’s FATF progress on its website under the heading titled “Jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies”:

“Since June 2018, when Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and to address its strategic counter- terrorist financing-related deficiencies, Pakistan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including the recent development of its TF risk assessment addendum; however, it does not demonstrate a proper understanding of Pakistan’s transnational TF risk.

Pakistan should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by

(1) adequately demonstrating its proper understanding of the TF risks posed by the terrorist groups, and conducting supervision on a risk-sensitive basis

(2) demonstrating that remedial actions and sanctions are applied in cases of AML/CFT violations and that these actions have an effect on AML/CFT compliance by financial institutions

(3) demonstrating that competent authorities are cooperating and taking action to identify and take enforcement action against illegal money or value transfer services (MVTS)

(4) demonstrating that authorities are identifying cash couriers and enforcing controls on illicit movement of currency and understanding the risk of cash couriers being used for TF

(5) improving inter-agency coordination including between provincial and federal authorities on combating TF risks

(6) demonstrating that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are identifying and investigating the widest range of TF activity and that TF investigations and prosecutions target designated persons and entities, and persons and entities acting on behalf or at the direction of the designated persons or entities

(7) demonstrating that TF prosecutions result in effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and enhancing the capacity and support for prosecutors and the judiciary; and

(8) demonstrating effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions (supported by a comprehensive legal obligation) against all 1267 and 1373 designated terrorists and those acting for or on their behalf, including preventing the raising and moving of funds, identifying and freezing assets (movable and immovable), and prohibiting access to funds and financial services

(9) demonstrating enforcement against TFS violations including administrative and criminal penalties and provincial and federal authorities cooperating on enforcement cases

(10) demonstrating that facilities and services owned or controlled by designated person are deprived of their resources and the usage of the resources. The FATF expresses concern that not only did Pakistan fail to complete its action plan items with January deadlines, it also failed to complete its action plan items due May 2019. The FATF strongly urges Pakistan to swiftly complete its action plan by October 2019 when the last set of action plan items are set to expire. Otherwise, the FATF will decide the next step at that time for insufficient progress.”

What do the FATF Findings Imply?

A huge bucket list of requirements indeed. The sheer legal jargon rampant in the official statement leaves one flabbergasted. The following are some key takeaways:

1: First, while FATF acknowledges Pakistan has taken “steps” towards improving the AML/CFT regime, FATF nevertheless notes that “it does not demonstrate a proper understanding of Pakistan’s transnational TF [terror financing] risk”. If there were meaningful progress on the ground, one would expect FATF to acknowledge Pakistan having taken “positive” steps. Sadly, this is not the case.

2: Two, the entire gamut of AML/CFT requirements noted in serial numbers 1-10, which were specified at the time of Pakistan’s June 2018 greylisting, have been reiterated by FATF. Not good. Not just that, the list is apparently non-exhaustive (note the choice of words: “including by”). This leaves Pakistan with a rather huge AML/CFT wish list.

3: In no uncertain terms, FATF has expressed “concern that not only did Pakistan fail to complete its action plan items with January deadlines, it also failed to complete its action plan items due May 2019.” This indicates Pakistan’s repeated failure to meet FATF requirements despite being informed about those requirements in earlier rounds.

4: In an ominous warning that all options are on the table, the statement concludes: “The FATF strongly urges Pakistan to swiftly complete its action plan by October 2019 when the last set of action plan items are set to expire. Otherwise, the FATF will decide the next step at that time for insufficient progress.” It is important to note that no other country (and the list includes honorable mentions such as Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, etc.) has been addressed in such strong language.

The “Narrow Escape”

Media reports indicate that Pakistan had a narrow escape in avoiding the blacklist in the June plenary. This was after a resolution was moved by India to get Pakistan blacklisted. This is not new. Earlier, too, in February this year, India had similarly (thankfully, unsuccessfully) tried to get Pakistan blacklisted. A serving Indian bureaucrat is a co-chair of the APG (an associate member of the FATF). APG was tasked with reviewing Pakistan’s AML/CFT progress.

Around that time, Pakistan’s Finance Minister had written to the FATF President and sought the removal of the co-chair citing “conflict of interest”. Right, move by Pakistan at the right time. But are such diplomatic manoeuvres enough on their own? Is Pakistan measuring success by being able to temporarily avoid the eye of the storm or, instead, by being able to avoid the storm altogether? Perhaps an even bigger question is: does Pakistan have a full understanding of why such storms gather in the first place and what needs to be done to avoid getting caught in their crosshairs?

Read more: Pakistan foils India’s attempt to get it blacklisted by FATF

Despite all the work on the ground done by Pakistan, FATF seems to think otherwise. What could possibly explain this?

There are two ways of looking at this. First is to view it through the geo-strategic lens. This is the easy one. Second is by answering some hard questions and more importantly, doing some deep introspection. This will be the bitter pill to swallow for Pakistan’s policymakers.

Pakistan’s Move Away from the US Orbit

First, geo-strategy. Let’s face it: Pakistan is no longer a U.S. ally. Regardless of whether it was a strategic or an economic relationship and irrespective of its inherently unequal nature, the fact is that it is now a relic of the past. This is evident from the fact that the U.S. is no longer turning a blind eye to India’s repeated narrative against Pakistan.

To India’s chagrin, that is something the U.S. used to do when Pakistan was viewed as indispensable to U.S strategy. Not anymore. India’s anti-Pakistan narrative got a new set of ears after President Trump came into power. With its axe to grind against Pakistan and to deviate the world from its failures and brutality in Kashmir, India has upped the ante against its archnemesis, Pakistan.

India’s efforts are helped by the fact that more than ever before, U.S. and India are closely aligned strategically, militarily and economically. Modi 2.0 means that US-India are now exactly on the same page where Pakistan is concerned.

Concomitant with the Indian move towards the U.S. camp, Pakistan for its strategic, military and economic needs has moved further into China’s orbit. China views Pakistan as a vital plank in its South Asia calculus. Importantly for China, Pakistan’s CPEC is the bridgehead that links its BRI to the West. All this in India’s geopolitical rear wouldn’t be taken lightly either by the U.S. or India.

A vertical collision course has thus been set between two opposite nexuses: U.S.-India and China-Pakistan. The result of this two-way geo-strategic repositioning has meant a clear dichotomy for the U.S.: it now sees Pakistan as a threat to its interests. The contours of the U.S. policy were laid out in the early morning tweet by President Donald Trump on 1st January 2018.

How has this policy been implemented in practice? Rather tactfully thus far. Instead of opening a war front against Pakistan (something neither easy without a ready pretext for waging war nor an easy sell in today’s world), by taking a page from its own playbook, the U.S. is instead using arm twisting and pursuing coercive diplomacy against Pakistan. Mostly blowing hot, but occasionally cold (just enough to keep the lines of communication open with Pakistan), the U.S., with clear support from India, is strategically marshaling the international legal system against Pakistan.

Pakistan must learn from its mistakes. Going a step further, Pakistan must take full stock of how this lawfare has panned out, how did Pakistan land in the greylist in the first place and why has Pakistan consistently failed to comply with the requirements.

Dragging Pakistan’s delegation in the corridors of power, showing Pakistan the international mirror, pulling it up for non-compliance, exposing its shortcomings, etc. is more damning for Pakistan than suffering casualties or losses here or there in war. The script was written some time back but the ink is still wet and newer chapters continue to be penned.

Capitalizing on Pakistan’s vulnerabilities is the name of this game. Legal technicalities and nuances are being pulled out to ask Pakistan to “do more”. Using their political outreach, U.S.-India are positioning law to convince the world to view Pakistan as an anomaly. FATF presidency which vests in the U.S. since June 2018 (expiry date:30 June 2019) has allowed the U.S. and India to garner wide global support against Pakistan.

This has inevitably transformed the lawfare into a mishmash of legal and political requirements pointed directly at Pakistan. All this is aimed at where it can hurt most: Pakistan’s economy, its lifeline, which Pakistan has been desperately trying to keep afloat.

Pakistan’s Efforts

To give credit where it is due, since being placed on the FATF greylist, Pakistan has indeed taken some positive steps to comply with the AML/CFT requirements. It introduced new laws, amended existing laws, introduced processes to document transactions with a view to ensuring funds are not used for TF purposes and also imposed a ban on proscribed outfits such as Jamat-ud-Dawa’h, and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). At the same time that Pakistan took these steps, in May this year the UNSC designated JeM’s chief Masood Azhar a global terrorist after China removed its technical hold which it had placed earlier.

Regardless, Pakistan has failed to convince FATF of substantive progress. FATF has conducted reviews since June 2018. As recently as February this year, FATF noted Pakistan’s “limited progress” on certain action items and urged Pakistan to swiftly complete its action plan. Again in May this year, FATF determined that Pakistan’s compliance with the AML/CFT requirements was unsatisfactory.

Pakistan’s Sole Arsenal: “Friendly Countries”

Like in the past, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and diplomatic corps reached out to “friendly countries” to apprise them of the AML/CFT steps taken by Pakistan and sought their support in the October FATF plenary when Pakistan’s case will come up for review. In line with the FATF charter, in order to avoid getting blacklisted, Pakistan will require the support of a minimum of three countries.

Media reports indicate that Pakistan is confident of support from Malaysia, Turkey, China, GCC and some European countries such as the UK (which, as per media reports, has promised to support Pakistan at the October plenary). However, the same media reports also confirm that Pakistan is wary that it is not as yet completely “out of the woods”.

The only weapon in Pakistan’s arsenal seems to be the goodwill of “friendly countries”, otherwise known as political capital. What baffles the mind is the fact that in this time and age, Pakistan has been able to generate goodwill that translates to support of only 3 to 4 countries (plus or minus a few that may be lost due to a political change of heart).

That leaves Pakistan with meager support of less than 10 % of the FATF members. Pakistan can, therefore, say goodbye to exiting greylist (which requires 15 out of 36 votes) unless our diplomatic corps manages to convince slightly less than 50% of the world to side with Pakistan. A rather sordid state of affairs, to say the least.

Read more: “Do more” to get out of FATF greylist: Experts to govt

This is despite the fact that the present government has adopted a multi-layered diplomatic strategy to deal with challenges at both the economic and security fronts. While this strategy may work at the economic front, it alone cannot suffice at the security front. More specifically with reference to the FATF, diplomacy alone cannot be relied upon to bail out Pakistan every time.

Notably, Pakistan’s strategy to rely on diplomacy to bail it out from FATF this time is ‘chapter and verse’ similar to the approach Pakistan adopted in 2012 after it was put on the greylist. Yes, diplomacy had succeeded in extricating Pakistan out of the greylist back then. But the facts, the narrative, the world, and above all, perceptions, have changed since then. Would it be wise to assume that what worked for Pakistan in 2012 will work this time around?

Some Policy Slips

Pakistan has also made some policy slips which could have been avoided. Assuming Pakistan has indeed been able to extract a promise or two from the UK (or some other countries for that matter) to support its case at the October plenary, there was absolutely no need for Pakistan’s Foreign Minister to disclose this to the media.

Why give out such sensitive information which can be used by Pakistan’s enemies to force a volte-face by countries that can potentially support Pakistan at the October plenary? Lawfare is as much about couching the policy argument in legal vernacular as it is about keeping matters under wraps. Diplomacy works best behind the scenes.

Dragging Pakistan’s delegation in the corridors of power, showing Pakistan the international mirror, pulling it up for non-compliance, exposing its shortcomings, etc. is more damning for Pakistan than suffering casualties or losses here or there in war. The script was written some time back but the ink is still wet and newer chapters continue to be penned.

Adding to its woes, Pakistan has made it a point to always get down to dirty boxing with India at the diplomatic front. This is mostly a reflex in response to the Indian government, policy maker and their media’s sabre rattling against Pakistan. In the FATF context, Indian proclamations about the imminent “blacklisting” of Pakistan normally unseat us rather quickly.

Instead of responding to everything thrown its way, Pakistan should think of repeating its earlier rather successful lawfare performance against India: after India’s claims of having killed some 300 odd terrorists in Balakot in February this year, Pakistan achieved a rare diplomatic victory by exposing the frivolity of the Indian claim. Pakistan did this by sharing concrete evidence with the world to disprove India’s claims and by inviting/taking international journalists to ground zero.

This hurt India more than its two downed jets. India was left red-faced and scrambling for answers. In the FATF context, however, Pakistan’s lawfare which should have been completed yesterday will now require a multiprong strategy: a concrete “will” to get down to business, a tad more smartness and above all, a sense of immediate urgency.

And, finally, some internal failures

Pakistan is left with two months before its AML/CFT performance will be reviewed by FATF in September (this is a month before a decision is taken in October). Pakistan is fully aware of what FATF is looking for. It’s a matter of pulling up the socks and getting down to business. Pakistan cannot afford to miss the forest for the trees anymore.

Media reports indicate that Pakistan’s biggest challenge has been to get agencies to work together in plugging the gaps. This is unacceptable. This “multi-agency effort” will involve state institutions/ministries/agencies such as MOFA, regulators, NACTA, FBR, Counter-Terrorism Departments or CTDs, FIA, etc.

Only those in the highest echelons of power in Pakistan can pull up all those responsible for getting this done. Those failing to deliver by the specified deadlines must be taken to task and severely penalized. It’s a matter of Pakistan’s survival and no one should be spared.

Collectively, these agencies are required to exhibit Pakistan’s compliance with reference to the TF risk assessment; demonstrating action taken against illegal money transfers; demonstrating “investigation, prosecution and conviction” by law enforcement agencies; freezing assets of designated individuals and entities; demonstrating that “law enforcement agencies are identifying and investigating the widest range of TF activity” and showing that “prosecutions result in effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions”.

Only those in the highest echelons of power in Pakistan can pull up all those responsible for getting this done. Those failing to deliver by the specified deadlines must be taken to task and severely penalized. It’s a matter of Pakistan’s survival and no one should be spared.

Some Food for Thought

Pakistan’s threats and challenges are not showing any signs of relenting. Reassuringly, however, Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government is making unprecedented efforts to change Pakistan for the better. This includes a genuine resolve to bring the house in order, not taking sides in any disputes in the neighbourhood or beyond, pursuing a foreign policy of “neutrality” and (most recently) declaring that previous polices such as “strategic depth” are a “dead horse”.

Together with these positives, it is time that Pakistan institutionalizes lawfare and devises its own centralized and robust lawfare strategy. Ideally, this strategy must come under the umbrella of a stand-alone lawfare institute positioned at a ministerial level. The following are some areas that Pakistan should consider bringing under the lawfare umbrella:

  1. A full and complete conceptual overview of the international obligations of Pakistan in the public and private international law spheres. It is not just public international law (U.N., FATF, maritime, cyberlaw, anti-terrorism laws, etc.) where Pakistan has been caught off guard without knowing what is happening before it can know what to do, but equally important, there has to be an end to the bleeding of millions of dollars in losses in private international law and international arbitration cases (Riko Diq mining case and Karkey Karadeniz arbitration, to name a few).
  2. Pakistan must creatively, consistently and promptly harness the international legal rules to achieve its strategic and policy objectives. Knowledge of the law is half the battle and the inevitable starting point. Unless Pakistan keeps abreast of what is “out there” in terms of international requirements, it will always make last-minute scrambles like it is doing before FATF. This risky business of last-minute crash courses to pass the exam must end.
  3. Lawfare must be used by Pakistan to identify points of leverage over the adversary and weaknesses in its own arsenal as well as that of its adversaries. Pakistan can learn a thing or two from China which has a robust lawfare strategy (lawfare in Chinese is called “falu zhan”). Notably, China’s lawfare strategy is more robust and institutionalized than that of the U.S. and other Western countries.
  4. A robust network of think tanks must be positioned around Pakistan’s lawfare strategy to assess, weigh, examine and advise Pakistan on international obligations. In this time and age, Pakistan is seriously short on think tanks that can be the strategic arm of the state and echo its policy statements at international forums.
  5. Pakistan’s lawfare must be fully integrated with its war machine (the Armed Forces) in a manner that either can leverage the other to gain a strategic and tactical advantage. Cyber lawfare, which is a burgeoning arm of lawfare, is employed by the U.S. and China in several security domains. In a time and age when a hacker using a computer can neutralize an entire weapons system, Pakistan must immediately set up a robust cyber command and control centre that is fully integrated with its Armed Forces.
  6. Pakistan’s lawfare can have an offensive and/or defensive posture or can be aligned with Pakistan’s strategic doctrine of “offensive-defence”. Such posture can be positioned around specific doctrines or can be left fluid depending on the threat, the environment and the response required, etc. All this will require a complete backward integration that takes full stock of the existing threats and challenges emanating from different verticals.
  7. The success of lawfare in today’s time and age depends on a credible international or regional media house that is strategically aligned with the policy objectives underscored in the lawfare strategy. Russia’s RT (despite being labelled the Kremlin’s propaganda arm by the West) is an example of how media houses are used in the present day to present the “alternative viewpoint”. At some stage in its lawfare, Pakistan will have to position a media house that can project a credible viewpoint before the world.
  8. Last but not least, Pakistan’s lawfare must identify competent diplomats, international lawyers and policymakers who can join Pakistan’s lawfare. Such professionals can help Pakistan sift through and separate the genuine international norms and rules from the corroded and politicized rules thrown Pakistan’s way for coercion and arm twisting. This can help Pakistan in knowing fully well the international requirements and thus suitably prepare and respond.
Conclusion

The pen is now ever mightier than the sword. Law does not operate in a vacuum and requires an environment in which to seed. That environment is provided by politics. Politics and law can also merge together to form a deadly cocktail. The lawfare against Pakistan, currently underway, is a mishmash of law and politics. Notwithstanding the politicization of the process, the outwardly manifestation of the eventual requirements on Pakistan are made to appear as solely “legal” in nature.

Pakistan can argue endlessly that U.S.-India are behind all this (and they are, no doubt). But that will not help Pakistan. What can help, however, is seriousness and a genuine desire to undo the FATF damage on a war footing by understanding that the world is speaking the language of law and Pakistan must respond in the same coin.

With reference to the October plenary that is around the corner, Pakistan must immediately ensure closing all gaps, drain the swamp of whosoever is engaged in money laundering and burn the rabbit hole of the remnants of the terrorist financing networks, their enablers, and benefactors. With two months left before the September review, frankly, Pakistan is left with no other choice.

Read more: Pakistan in midst of aggressive FATF lawfare

Lessons for the Future

Pakistan must learn from its mistakes. Going a step further, Pakistan must take full stock of how this lawfare has panned out, how did Pakistan land in the greylist in the first place and why has Pakistan consistently failed to comply with the requirements. For the future, Pakistan must institutionalize its own lawfare strategy that is comprehensive and all-encompassing and focused around a genuine desire to be prepared in advance to respond adequately.

Lawfare campaigns may end up being like blockbuster movies: while the characters may change, the theme remains the same. If the current FATF campaign against Pakistan is a sequel of the earlier 2012 campaign, it is hoped that it will have the same ending: Pakistan securing an exit from the greylist. But if this is wishful thinking, it is sincerely hoped that Pakistan will avoid being moved to the FATF blacklist. That will do Pakistan, its economy and its people a lot of good.

Hassan Aslam Shad is the head of corporate and international practice of a leading law firm of Oman. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School, USA, with a focus on international law. Hassan has written extensively on topics of law, including public & private international law and international relations. Hassan has the distinctive honor of being the first person from Pakistan to intern at the Office of the President of the International Criminal Court, The Hague. He has also represented Pakistan at the prestigious Jean Pictet international law moot court competition. He can be reached at: veritas@post.harvard.edu

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Global Village Space.

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